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The tragedy of the Ebola pandemic illustrates and confirms the need for information 
sharing in a coordinated pandemic response. However, high-profile cases reported in 
the news media, videos of sick, dying, or orphaned individuals in highly intimate and 
tragic situations as well as public health news conferences and hospital statements 
have brought to light the privacy implications of pandemic news reporting and public 
health intervention measures. This article contributes to the ongoing legal, ethical, 
and social debate regarding the role, if any, to afford to personal privacy in an 
effective, globalized, and electronic public health surveillance system and pandemic 
response.  Our working assumption is that there should be a role. However, privacy 
governance frameworks are, at best, incomplete in ensuring effective and protective 
use of personal information in pandemics response. 
 
 
1.  Context 
 
In the 21st century, public health policies and interventions must contend with high 
human mobility, cross-border data sharing, and unprecedented data analytics 
capability, all while expectations of privacy continue to evolve. Data surveillance has 
become a key component of pandemic response plans. Experts predict that the future 
of public health data surveillance will involve the automatic collection of patient data 
from electronic health records, which may include the patient’s name, address, risk 
factors, previous immunizations, and treatment.1 Data collection for pandemics 
intervention would therefore become a by-product of electronic health record systems 
used in clinical care. One can imagine the pressure to share information across state 
borders for even more effective global surveillance. 
 
While public health objectives are imperative during a pandemic, patients and 
suspected patients will be quick to highlight the privacy risks of pandemic response 
measures such as the public and institutional dissemination of personal information. 
At the individual level, these risks include ostracism, stigmatization, exposure of 
                                                     
* Chantal Bernier is a Counsel, Liane Fong is an Associate, and Timothy M Banks is a Partner, each at 
Dentons Canada LLP. The views expressed in this paper are the authors’ alone as of the date of writing 
this paper. They do not represent those of our clients or firm, and our views are subject to change in this 
highly dynamic area of law. We are grateful for the research assistance of Aiwen Xu, Student-at-Law, in 
the preparation of this paper. 
1 See e.g. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Use of Data from the Electronic Health Record 
for Health Research: current governance challenges and potential approaches”, by Donald J Willison 
(Ottawa: OPC, March 2009) at para 1.2.3, online: <https://www.priv.gc.ca/information/research-
recherche/2009/ehr_200903_e.asp> (“[w]ith the advent of the common interoperable [electronic health 
records], gleaning of data for public health reporting is likely to become automated”).” 
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lifestyle, and restriction of freedom. At the collective level, intrusive measures may 
lead to discrimination, the erosion of medical support through the alienation of 
potential workers, and the subversion of containment efforts due to the reluctance of 
patients to seek treatment for fear of the consequences. 
 
Therefore, in the context of electronic global information sharing and 
analysis, the full realization of public health surveillance goals to prevent and control 
pandemics requires commensurate safeguards to protect individual privacy and 
information security. Policy makers must aim to develop a framework that balances 
individual and collective interests. As discussed below, this will require both 




2.  A few facts to ground our legal analysis  
 
A pandemic is defined as the global outbreak of a disease, entailing, by definition, 
cross-border manifestations.2 Public health surveillance is described as the 
“continuous, systematic collection, analysis and interpretation of health-related data 
needed for the planning, implementation, and evaluation of public health 
practice.”3 The information exchange is ideally multi-institutional and multi-
disciplinary. Personal health information relates to the individual, while aggregate 
health data is population-level data reflecting collective trends. Some interventions 
require personal record-level data, while others require merely population-level data.4 
In addition to personal health data, public health surveillance may also need to rely on 
other personal information such as cell phone data or other geographical location 
systems. Mobile phone data (in the form of call data records) are viewed as important 
mechanisms for providing researchers with the ability to map outbreaks and track 
population flows so as to anticipate future areas of outbreaks and implement 
preventative measures.5 In Mexico, for example, analysis of call data records has 
                                                     
2  World Health Organization bulletins have referred to the classic definition of “pandemic,” which is “an 
epidemic occurring worldwide, or over a very wide reach, crossing international boundaries and usually 
affecting a large number of people”. See Heath Kelly, “The classical definition of a pandemic is not 
elusive” (2011) 89:9 Bulletin of the World Health Organization 540, online: 
<www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/89/7/11-088815/en/>, citing JM Last, A Dictionary of Epidemiology, 4th 
ed (New York, Oxford University Press, 2001).   
3 World Health Organization, “Public health surveillance” (2014), online: WHO 
<www.who.int/topics/public_health_surveillance/en/>. 
4 For example, certain pandemic response measures such as contact tracing or “other investigations that 
require public health to communicate directly with patients” require personal information. See Khaled El 
Emam et al, "Physician Privacy Concerns When Disclosing Patient Data for Public Health Purposes 
During a Pandemic Influenza Outbreak" (2011) 11:454 BMC Public Health, online: BMC 
<www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/11/454>.  
5 “Call for Help”, The Economist (25 October 2014), online: 
<www.economist.com/news/leaders/21627623-mobile-phone-records-are-invaluable-tool-combat-
ebola-they-should-be-made-available>. See also Pierre Deville et al, “Dynamic Population Mapping 
Using Mobile Phone Data”, (2014) 111:45 Proceedings of the National Academic of Sciences of the 
United States of America 15888, online: <www.pnas.org/content/111/45/15888.full>. Non-profit 
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helped to measure how effective government mobility restrictions on citizens were in 
controlling the spread of the H1N1 flu epidemic.6 In many cases, population-level data 
may simply be insufficient when dealing with serious virulent diseases that may 
require contact tracing and isolation measures to control spread of the illness. 
 
Personal health information can be eponymous (where the individual’s name 
is included), pseudonymous (where the name is replaced by a code number), or 
anonymous, de-identified, or anonymized (where the identifiers have been removed 
from the health information).7 Technologists remind us regularly that even 
anonymized information can be linked back to identifiers with lesser or greater effort 
depending on numerous factors, such as the size of the sample and the nature of the 
information that is not de-identified.8 However, a practical approach would favour the 
deployment of anonymization where the process to re-identify would be so arduous to 
make it remote and unlikely.   
 
Intervention in pandemics includes several forms of personal health data 
collection, dissemination, and analysis. For example, pandemic response plans will 
call for reporting the identity of ill or suspected ill individuals to front line health 
workers and to multi-jurisdictional and multi-disciplinary authorities. These plans may 
also enable authorities to employ such methods as active surveillance of symptoms, 
isolation, quarantine, and contact tracing – including “aggressive contact tracing,” i.e., 
tracing persons who have been in contact with the ill individual.9  
                                                     
organization Flowminder uses “anonymized mobile phone network data, household surveys, and remote 
sensing data to improve planning and operational decision making in a range of areas including disaster 
response and climate impacts, disease outbreak prevention, and poverty reduction.” They only work with 
anonymized data at cell tower resolution or lower. Moreover, they sign MOUS/NDAs with participating 
telecom operators and store data in accordance with the industry’s standard security guidelines. See 
Flowminder, “For Telecom Operators”, online: Flowminer.org <www.flowminder.org/about/telecom-
operators/>. 
6 United Nations Global Pulse, “Mobile Phone Network Data for Development” (October 2013) at 5, 
online: UN Global Pulse <www.unglobalpulse.org/sites/default/files/Mobile%20Data%20for%20 
Development%20Primer_Oct2013.pdf>. 
7 Canada Health Infoway & Pan-Canadian Health Information Privacy Group, Privacy and EHR Information 
Flows in Canada, Version 2.0 (31 July 2012) at 41, online: Canada Health Infoway 
<https://www.infoway-inforoute.ca/index.php/resources/reports/privacy/doc_download/626-privacy-
and-ehr-information-flows-in-canada-version-2-0>. 
8 Adam Tanner, “Harvard Professor Re-Identifies Anonymous Volunteers In DNA Study”, Forbes (25 
April 2013), online: Forbes.com <www.forbes.com/sites/adamtanner/2013/04/25/harvard-professor-re-
identifies-anonymous-volunteers-in-dna-study/>. For a discussion and analysis of academic articles that 
critique the effectiveness of de-identification as well as a discussion of effective de-identification 
standards, see Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario & Information Technology and 
Innovation Foundation, “Big Data and Innovation, Setting the Record Straight: De-identification Does 
Work”, by Ann Cavoukian and Daniel Castro (Toronto: IPC, 16 June 2014), online: 
<www.privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2014/06/pbd-de-identification_ITIF1.pdf>.   
9 Public Health Agency of Canada, “The Canadian Pandemic Influenza Plan for the Health Sector” (Ottawa: 
PHAC, 2006) at Annex M, online: <www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/cpip-pclcpi/pdf-e/annex_m-eng.pdf>; World 
Health Organization, Department of Communicable Disease Surveillance and Response, WHO 
Consultation on Priority Public Health Interventions Before and During an Influenza Pandemic (Geneva: 
WHO, 2004) at 26, online: WHO Regional Office for Africa 
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In the event that human-to-human transmission of the disease is possible, 
privacy issues affect not only the person who is directly affected by a pandemic illness 
but also his or her contacts. In these cases, many individuals may be swept up into the 
public health care surveillance system prior to diagnosis. Serious illnesses that are 
easily transmitted may require isolation for a lengthy period of time until the likelihood 
that the person is a carrier can be ruled out or eliminated. Even if the person is not a 
carrier, the mere fact of isolation will most certainly involve revealing intimate details 
and sensitive information to friends, neighbours, family, employers, and social and 
religious affinity groups. Certainly, circumstances may require efforts such as 
isolation. However, mere knowledge that the person has come into contact with the 
illness may result in social isolation and stigmatization. 
 
Without question, clinical care and pandemics control require a certain degree 
of collection, disclosure, and analysis of personal information. The test for legitimacy 
of this use of personal information is one of proportionality and security. Privacy and 
security challenges arise from the difficulties around consent, the possible duty to 
disclose, the scope of dissemination – including across borders – the vulnerability of 
electronic platforms, the determination of consistent use, and balancing respect for 
individual privacy with the collective benefits of data analytics. 
 
 
3.  Privacy Implications 
 
(A) Duty to Disclose 
 
Whether patients suffering from an illness in a state of pandemic have a freestanding 
duty to disclose their infection or suspected infection has not been widely tested on a 
general basis in Canada. However, disclosure obligations can be imposed through 
legislation. Certain provincial health acts require persons who suspect that they are 
infected with a specified communicable disease to place themselves under the care of 
a medical practitioner or direction of a public health official.10   
 
In relation to pandemics, the closest situation to the duty to disclose is the 
legislative designation of reportable illnesses. During the 2003 SARS outbreak in 
Toronto, public health authorities took the voluntary quarantine and compliance 
approach. When the Ontario government designated SARS as a reportable, 
communicable, and virulent disease under the Ontario Health Protection Promotion 
Act (“HPPA”), public health authorities received the legislative authority to issue 
orders to detain and isolate individuals.11 During the outbreak, almost all patients who 
                                                     
<www.afro.who.int/fr/downloads/doc_download/5116-who-consultation-on-priority-public-health-
interventions-before-and-during-an-influenza-pandemic.html>.  
10 See e.g. Nunavut’s Communicable Diseases Regulations, RRNWT 1990 c P-13, s 2, as duplicated for 
Nunavut by s 29 of the Nunavut Act, SC 1993, c 28; Saskatchewan’s Public Health Act, 1994, SS 1994, 
c P-37.1, s 33; Yukon’s Communicable Disease Regulations, YCO 1961/048, s 3; Prince Edward Island’s 
Notifiable Diseases and Conditions and Communicable Diseases Regulations, PEI Reg EC560/13, s 4.  
11 For example, the Ontario Health Protection Promotion Act, RSO 1990, c H.7, s 22 [HPPA], authorizes a 
medical officer of health to issue an order under prescribed conditions in order to control the risk of the 
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were asked accepted the request for quarantine voluntarily. Only 27 written orders 
mandating quarantine under the Ontario HPPA were issued.12 
 
The federal Quarantine Act, which is intended to restrict the spread of 
communicable disease in Canada, also imposes a duty to disclose in certain 
circumstances.13 The Act imposes a requirement on travelers to disclose to a border 
screening officer or quarantine officer if they have “reasonable grounds” to believe 
they have been exposed to specific communicable diseases or have been in close 
proximity to a person who is likely to have a specified communicable disease.14 
Following a medical examination by a quarantine officer, a traveler may be required 
to comply with treatment or any other measure for preventing the introduction and 
spread of the communicable disease.15 When the Quarantine Act was introduced in 
2005 to repeal and update the previous version of the Act, the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada (“OPC”) generally supported its introduction, finding that 
the Act struck a balance between public health and privacy rights.16  
 
Beyond the immediate pandemic crisis, restrictions upon privacy may linger 
even where the disease or disorder becomes a chronic, manageable illness that 
nevertheless remains potentially infectious. We see this distinctly with HIV/AIDS. 
Although initially nearly unmanageable and frequently deadly, HIV is becoming 
increasingly manageable, yet it continues to carry significant stigma and disclosure 
obligations. These disclosure obligations can continue even when the risk of 
transmission is nearly scientifically negligible but is, in the view of the law, still 
realistically possible. In R v Cuerrier, the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) held that 
failure to disclose an HIV positive status to a sexual partner is fraud, thus vitiating 
consent to a sexual activity and constituting aggravated assault.17 Subsequent cases 
used this analysis to form the elements of aggravated assault or aggravated sexual 
assault.18 Over a decade later, in R v Mabior, the SCC further clarified this standard 
when it set out that consent is vitiated if there is a “realistic possibility that HIV will 
                                                     
outbreak of a communicable disease. These orders can require individuals and groups to be placed in 
isolation or to place themselves under the care and treatment of a medical professional. 
12 Mark A Rothstein et al, “Quarantine and Isolation: Lessons Learned from SARS” (November 2003) at 
58, online: Law, Science and Public Health Program Site <biotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw/cdc/ 
SARS_REPORT.pdf>. http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw/cdc/SARS_REPORT.pdf 
13 SC 2005, c 20 [Quarantine Act]. 
14 Ibid, s 15(2).  
15 Ibid, s 26.  
16 Raymond D’Aoust, “Bill C-12, the Quarantine Act” (Ottawa: 18 November 2004), online: 
<https://www.priv.gc.ca/media/sp-d/2004/sp-d_041118_e.asp> (statement delivered to the House 
Standing Committee on Health). 
17 [1998] 2 SCR 371 at para 66, McLachlin J [Cuerrier].. 
18 Isabel Grant, “Prosecution of Non-disclosure of HIV in Canada: Time to Re-think Cuerrier” (2011) 5:1 
MJLH 7 at 9, online: <mjlh.mcgill.ca/pdfs/vol5-1/mjlh_vol5-1.pdf>. 
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be transmitted.”19 Where the person uses a condom and has a low viral load, the 
realistic possibility of transmission is negated.20  
 
In Mabior, the SCC declined to consider whether other sexually transmitted 
diseases would constitute “serious bodily harm” to meet the requirement for 
aggravated sexual assault, and stated: “where the line should be drawn with respect to 
diseases other than HIV is not before us.”21 However, Canadian jurisprudence has had 
occasion to consider whether other communicable diseases, including herpes, also 
carry with it a duty to disclose.22 The trend among these cases shows that there is a 
duty to disclose where the behaviour about to be engaged in with another person puts 
that person at significant risk of serious bodily harm.  
 
Whether non-disclosure of a communicable disease will attract penalties will 
depend on whether there is a statutory requirement applicable in the circumstances, or 
whether it is viewed to meet the standards of a criminal offense, such as for aggravated 
assault in “endanger[ing] the life of [a] complainant.”23 Countries such as Liberia have 
made it an offence to “knowingly, intentionally, or willfully” infect another person or 
group of persons with specified communicable diseases, which could criminalize the 
concealing of information by persons with communicable diseases.24  The significance 
of Liberia in the Ebola crisis may give precedents to other countries to follow suit.   
 
From these legislative provisions and case law emerges the fundamental rule 
that the right to privacy may only be infringed upon where the imperatives of public 
health are demonstrated. This has effects both at the collective level – say, in relation 
to quarantine measures or disclosure at the border – and at the individual level, where 
knowingly putting a person at risk of contracting an illness has been deemed to 
constitute criminal negligence and even sexual assault. In essence, the privacy interest 
in non-disclosure is weighed against the collective interest in disclosure. Until 
disclosure weighs in favour of the collective interest, the individual right to privacy 
must prevail.  
 
(B) The Notion of Consent in the Face of a Pandemic 
                                                     
19 2012 SCC 47 at paras 4, 91,104 [Mabior]. 
20 Ibid at paras 94-104. In a companion case, R v DC, 2012 SCC 48, the SCC applied the standard in Mabior 
that a significant risk of serious bodily harm is found in the presence of a realistic possibility of 
transmission and is negated by both low viral load and condom protection.  
21 Supra note 19 at para 92.  
22 For example, in R v JH, 2012 ONCJ 753, the offender pled guilty to sexual assault in failing to inform the 
complainant that he was likely infected with HSV-2 (herpes). In this case, the disease was transmitted to 
the complainant. 
23 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 268, which states: “Every one commits an aggravated assault who 
wounds, maims, disfigures or endangers the life of the complainant.” 
24 Legisature of Liberia, News Release, “House Passes Law to Criminalize the Concealing of Information 
of Persons with Communicable or Contiguous Infectious Diseases” (2 October 2014), online: Legislature 
of Liberia <legislature.gov.lr/house/news/2014/10/house-passes-law-criminalize-concealing-
information-persons-communicable-or-conti>. 
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The basic rule across Canada regarding personal health information is that it cannot be 
collected, used, or disclosed without consent, except as authorized or required by 
law.25 In the face of a pandemic, where more is at stake than the individual’s interests, 
consent becomes an issue. This begs the question regarding what the law authorizes in 
that context.  
 
In McInerney v McDonald, the SCC reiterated that no disclosure of personal 
health information is allowed unless disclosure is necessary in relation to paramount 
public interest such as the safety of individuals or the public.26 The parameters for 
applying this public interest test can be drawn from the Fair Information Principles as 
well as judicial interpretation of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.27 At a minimum, they require that the collection, use, or disclosure of 
personal health information be subject to consent unless: (1) express consent cannot 
be given but can be reasonably inferred from the actions or inactions of the patient 
seeking medical care when the effectiveness of the care depends upon the collection, 
                                                     
25 See e.g. the Ontario Personal Health Information Protection Act, 2004, SO 2004, c 3, Schedule A [Ontario 
PHIPA]. If the disclosure is made for the purpose of s 39(2) of the Ontario HPPA, supra note 11, the 
Ontario PHIPA permits health information custodians to disclose personal health information to a number 
of parties, including the Chief Medical Officer of Health, the Ontario Agency for Health Protection and 
Promotion, a medical officer for health, and a public health authority (in the same or another jurisdiction). 
The Ontario PHIPA also allows a health information custodian to disclose personal health information 
where permitted or required by law (s 29(3)). It also permits disclosure where the health information 
custodian believes on reasonable grounds that it is necessary in order to eliminate or reduce a significant 
risk of serious bodily harm to a person or group of persons (s 40(1)). For additional information on 
permitted disclosures in Ontario, see the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, “Fact Sheet: 
Disclosure of Information Permitted in Emergency or Other Circumstances” (Toronto: IPC, 2005), online:  
<www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/fact-07-e.pdf>. In addition, federal legislation – such as the Privacy 
Act, RSC 1985, c P-21, s 8(2)(m) – establish disclosure permissions for public interest reasons. The federal 
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, SC 2000, c 5, s 7(3)(e) [PIPEDA], also 
establishes exceptions to consent, including where disclosure is required in an emergency that threatens 
the health or security of an individual, subject to written notification requirements to the person to whom 
the information relates. In addition, an organization may disclose to a government institution if (1) the 
institution has made a request for the information, (2) the institution has identified its lawful authority to 
obtain the information, and (3) the disclosure is requested for the purpose of administering any law of 
Canada or a province (PIPEDA, s 7(3)(c.1)(iii)). Provincial legislation such as Ontario’s Freedom of 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSO 1990, c F.31 [FIPPA], and Municipal Freedom of 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSO 1990, c M.56 [MFIPPA], require a head of an institution 
to disclose a record if there are reasonable and probable grounds to believe that it is in the public interest 
to do so and that the record reveals a grave environmental, health, or safety hazard to the public. Such 
legislation also requires the head of an institution to provide notice to the affected individual upon such 
disclosure (FIPPA, s 11; MFIPPA, s 5). In compelling circumstances affecting the health or safety of an 
individual, an institution may disclose personal information without consent; however, it must notify the 
affected individual (FIPPA, ss 21(1)(b), 42(h); MFIPPA, ss 14(b), 32(h)). In the context of pandemic 
scenarios, these exceptions could be invoked where the personal information is used in the public interest 
in order to combat the spread of a communicable disease. 
26 [1992] 2 SCR 138 at 154, citing Halls v Mitchell, [1928] SCR 125 at 136, where Duff J held that “reasons 
connected with the safety of individuals or of the public, physical or moral” would be sufficient to override 
a patient’s right to confidentiality. 
27 PIPEDA, supra note 25, Schedule I; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]. 
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use, or disclosure of the information;28 or (2) public interest imperatives demonstrably 
displace individual rights to privacy.29   
 
Clinical care creates a very specific context for the requirement of consent. 
The health services which clinical patients seek are generally necessary. They 
therefore generally do not have a choice about the collection, use, or disclosure 
required for the provision of these services.30 While this fact may lower the 
requirements in relation to documenting and formalizing consent, it increases 
obligations in relation to safeguards and accountability as a corollary to the effectively 
diminished control of individuals over their personal health information. This imposes 
commensurate governance frameworks, safeguards, access to personal information, 
and recourse in relation to accuracy and protection of the information.  
 
However, it may be more appropriate in the initial high-risk, urgent-response 
phase of a pandemic to regulate privacy interests by focusing on legitimate uses and 
disclosures of personal health information in the name of public interest rather than to 
focus on consent. One schematic could be to regulate uses and disclosures through the 
following governance framework in the initial phase:  
 
(i) No consent would be required for direct or indirect collection if the 
collection was manifestly for and limited to a pandemic response; 
(ii) The demonstrated need for personal health information for the initial 
pandemic response would need to be supported by scientific evidence if 
transmission routes are known, or by peer-reviewed hypotheses if 
transmission routes are not known; and 
(iii) Any re-purposing of personal information – including for treatment in 
subsequent phases of the pandemic, non-pandemic research, and other 
purposes – would be subject to express consent unless the information 
was anonymized.31 The threshold risk of re-identification would need to 
                                                     
28 In R v Dyment, [1988] 2 SCR 417 at para 27 [Dyment], the SCC emphasized the sensitivity of health 
records and stated that “the use of a person's body without his consent to obtain information about him, 
invades an area of personal privacy essential to the maintenance of his human dignity.” The Court found 
that a doctor may take blood samples from an unconscious individual where it is used for medical 
treatment purposes. However, the Court held that unless the law otherwise requires, the blood samples 
may not be provided to a third party for non-medical purposes. Accordingly, law enforcement breached 
the individual’s privacy interest when it took the blood sample for evidence, which was an unreasonable 
“seizure” for the purposes of Section 8 of the Charter. See Dyment at para 31.  
29 Supra note 26.  
30 See e.g. Ontario PHIPA, supra note 25, s 38, which permits health information custodians to disclose 
personal health information to other health information custodians where (1) the disclosure is reasonably 
necessary for the provision of health care, (2) it is not reasonably possible to obtain the individual’s 
consent in a timely manner, and (3) the individual has not expressly instructed the custodian not to make 
the disclosure. See also the Ontario PHIPA, s 39(d), which permits the disclosure to certain health 
information custodians who have previously provided health care, where the disclosure is for the purpose 
of improving or maintaining the quality of care the receiving custodian provides to the individual or to 
individuals provided with similar healthcare.  
31 The authors acknowledge that, currently, provincial health privacy legislation set out exceptions that 
permit health information custodians to disclose personal health information without consent for research 
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be established by consensus and be commensurate to the context and the 
purposes for which the information would be used.  
 
This or a similar framework would govern the ethical and lawful use of personal 
information in pandemic prevention or response. It would do so in a manner respectful 




(C) Privacy in the Scope of Information Dissemination in Pandemic Response 
 
While the potential uses for personal health information are broad, the rule to 
determine permissible use is narrow. For instance, in the federal public sector, use of 
personal health information is permissible if such use is consistent (“compatible” in 
French) with the initial purpose for collection. In the private sector, the use of such 
information is permissible only if it is used for the purpose for which it was collected.32 
In general, these rules would entail continued recognition that personal health 
information cannot be used without express consent for any other use than to treat the 
patient, unless otherwise permitted by law. However, should the public interest in the 
use of information “clearly outweigh any invasion of privacy,” non-consensual use 
would be allowed in the paramount public interest. Still, it is subject to a demonstration 
based on scientific evidence of the necessity for the personal health information of a 
specific patient.33 
                                                     
purposes provided specific requirements and strict conditions are met. See e.g. the Ontario PHIPA, supra 
note 25, s 44.  
32 Privacy Act, supra note 25, s 7; PIPEDA, supra note 25, s 5(3), Principle 4.5; Alberta’s Personal 
Information Protection Act, SA 2003, c P-6.5, s 16; British Columbia’s Personal Information Protection 
Act, SBC 2003, c 63, s 14; Quebec’s An Act Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the 
Private Sector, CQLR c P-39.1, s 5. 
33 See e.g. Privacy Act, supra note 25, s 7(b). See also Ontario PHIPA, supra note 25, s 40, which permits 
disclosure of personal health information for public interest and public health purposes, and also permits 
health information custodians to disclose where they believe on reasonable grounds that disclosure is 
necessary for the purpose of eliminating or reducing a significant risk of serious bodily harm to a person 
or a group of persons. In Canadian AIDS Society v. Ontario (1995), 25 OR (3d) 388 (Ct J (GD)), aff’d 
[1996] OJ No 4184 (CA), the Court found that the mandatory reporting of HIV-positive statuses under 
the Ontario HPPA triggered Charter rights under ss 7 and 8. A Red Cross laboratory had tested some 
blood samples it had collected ten years prior and discovered that they were HIV positive. However, at 
the time of collection, the Red Cross did not inform the donors that their blood would be tested for the 
HIV virus. In the circumstances of the case, the Court found that disclosure of the statuses did not 
represent a violation of those rights; it accorded with the principles of fundamental justice and was 
reasonable, having regard to the importance given to the public health interest (at paras 131 and 158). 
Even if such mandatory reporting requirements violated ss 7 and 8 Charter rights, they would be justified 
under the Oakes test in s 1 as being rationally connected to the objective of protecting public health. While 
less intrusive measures were considered, the Court concluded that there were no viable options short of 
full compliance with the full reporting requirements. In discussing the Ontario HPPA as a whole, the 
Court stated (at para 168) that the “provisions are reasonable, and infringe rights as little as possible. As 
well, the effects of enforcement are not harmful in relation to the benefits of compliance with the reporting 
requirements of the HPPA” at para 168. Importantly, the Court highlighted the high mortality rates that 
existed at the time and emphasized the public health benefits of reporting, and noted (at paras 100, 102) 
that “a reporting of HIV positive status pursuant to the Acts cannot control the spread of the disease. It is 
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Pandemic response plans typically consist of several phases, which have 
different requirements for information sharing at each phase. Use of personal health 
information must be strictly necessary for the required public health intervention. In 
other words, personal health information cannot be disclosed unless for consistent use 
or as dictated by necessary intervention. Privacy legislation attempts to balance the 
individual’s privacy of personal health information rights with the collective’s need 
for disclosure and reporting by health care providers for public health or other public 
interest reasons. Sharing personal health information without consent is recognized as 
discretionary or mandatory in limited public health and public interest circumstances, 
particularly where the individual harm of disclosure fades before the collective harm 
of non-disclosure. 
 
It follows that when the potential for a pandemic threat has not reached a level 
of emergency or when that threat has subsided – i.e., the least-risk phase – only 
population-level information is required. Therefore, where the population health risk 
is low, no personal information can legally be collected, used, or disclosed without 
consent. In other instances where only indicator-based surveillance efforts are required 
to monitor a potential pandemic and direct contact with a patient is unnecessary, any 
personal health information that is disclosed should merely be de-identified. However, 
where aggregate data – meaning data that is severed from identifiers and merged into 
one series of trends – indicates the potential for a pandemic outbreak, state authorities 
could then use technology that allows for re-identification of the data to make the link 
back to the original data. De-identified or general information – such as statistical, 
aggregate, and anonymous epidemiological results – does not trigger the same privacy 
legislation considerations, subject to ensuring that information cannot be re-identified. 
However, in a high-risk phase, personal health information may be needed for tracing 
and monitoring individuals. In these scenarios information regarding these indicators 
would be shared only with pre-determined responsible authorities such as hospitals 
and health ministries.  
 
In Canada and the United States, legislation broadens the scope for 
dissemination in situations where it is required to protect the interests of public health. 
Canadian provincial health privacy legislation generally permits – and in some cases 
requires – regulated entities to report personal health information to public health 
authorities without consent for certain public health purposes.34 The US Health 
                                                     
the counselling, education and cooperation by members of high risk groups and those infected that will 
have an impact on changing behavior and stemming the spread of the disease.”   
34 See e.g. supra note 25. In light of provincial mandatory notification requirements, certain medical 
practitioners and laboratories – and, in some cases, institutions and school authorities – might be required 
to provide the relevant public health authority with information about certain reportable communicable 
diseases. The information required to be reported varies by province but depending on the disease may 
include details about the affected individual, including contacts, places visited, and more. See e.g. 
Ontario’s Reports, RRO 1990, Reg 569; Alberta’s Communicable Diseases Regulation, Alta Reg 
238/1985; Prince Edward Island’s Notifiable Diseases and Conditions and Communicable Diseases 
Regulations, PEI Reg EC560/1; New Brunswick’s Reporting and Diseases Regulation, NB Reg 2009-
136; Nova Scotia’s Communicable Diseases Regulation NS Reg 196/2005; Quebec’s Minister's 
Regulation under the Public Health Act, CQLR c S-2.2, r 2. 
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Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) Privacy Rule is another 
legislative attempt at striking the appropriate balance between individual privacy 
interests and public health concerns.35 HIPAA’s Privacy Rule permits certain health 
care providers, health plans, and health care clearinghouses – i.e., “covered entities” – 
to disclose personal health information to authorized public health authorities and their 
authorized representatives for public health surveillance, investigations, and 
interventions.36 While HIPAA permits public health disclosures without consent of the 
patient, it does not require it. However, applicable US federal or state laws may require 
reporting of specified communicable diseases. Canadian provincial health laws also 
contain mandatory notification requirements with respect to certain communicable 
diseases.37 In any case, where disclosure is made to public health authorities, the 
fundamental right to privacy, as universally recognized, dictates that only the 
minimum amount of personal information necessary to meet the public health need 
should be disclosed.38  
 
The scope for dissemination broadens again where pandemic emergencies 
threaten to become uncontrollable. In the face of such a threat, personal health 
information could be shared with additional authorities such as law enforcement and 
customs authorities. At each point, the collection, use, and disclosure of personal 
information must be based on scientific evidence of necessity in order to prevent and 
control the pandemic spread. Here, again, concern for the collective harm of non-
disclosure re-surfaces. 
 
                                                     
35 45 CFR §§ 160, 162, and 164 [HIPAA]. 
36 Ibid, § 165.501 and §164.512(b)(1)(i). At the direction of a public health authority, a covered entity may 
also disclose protected health information to a foreign government agency that is acting in collaboration 
with a public health authority (§164.512(b)(1)(i)). A covered health care provider may also disclose 
protected health information in order to notify a person that he or she has been exposed to a communicable 
disease, provided that the law authorizes the covered entity to do so in order to prevent or control the 
spread of the disease during a public health intervention or investigation (§164.512(b)(1)(iv)). For more 
information on HIPAA in emergency situations, see generally, US Department of Health & Human 
Services, Office of Civil Rights, Bulletin: HIPAA Privacy in Emergency Situations  (Washington DC: US 
HHS, 2014), online: <www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/ 
hipaa/understanding/special/emergency/emergencysituations.pdf> [Bulletin].   
37 Supra note 34. For example, the Ontario HPPA, supra note 11, ss 25–28, contain requirements for various 
individuals – including physicians, medical practitioners, hospital administrators, superintendents of 
institutions, school principals, operators of laboratories, and more – to report to the local medical officer 
of health of the health unit instances of specific reportable and /or communicable diseases. See also 
Specification of Reportable Diseases Regulation, O Reg 559/91. The content of required reports are set 
out by regulation and require the reporting of personal information including name, address, sex, and 
other details. For example, reports related to Ebola by a physician or practitioner must also include the 
date of diagnosis, travel history outside Canada and places of travel within Canada in the week prior to 
and since onset of the illness, clinical history, and more (Reports, RRO 1990, Reg 569, ss 1 and 5(4)). 
38 Under HIPAA, when disclosing personal health information to a public health authority, covered entities 
may reasonably rely on the determination made by the public health authority that the minimum amount 
of information has been requested for the stated purpose. See HIPAA, supra note 35, 
§164.514(d)(3)(iii)(A). Where public health disclosures are routine or recurring, covered entities must 
develop standard protocols that address the types and amount of protected health information that may be 
disclosed for such purposes to ensure that they disclose only the minimum amount of personal information 
required to achieve the purpose is disclosed. See HIPAA, supra note 35, §164.514(d)(3)(i). 
128 UNB LJ     RD UN-B [VOL/TOME 66] 
 
Where there has been a request for information about a named patient, HIPAA 
permits a hospital or other health care facility to acknowledge an individual is a patient 
at the facility and provide basic information about the patient’s condition in general 
terms, subject to certain conditions.39 The patient or their legally authorized 
representative must provide written authorization before the facility can make more 
detailed disclosures. Such disclosures include affirmative reporting to the media about 
an identifiable patient and about their specific treatment information, such as specific 
tests.40 The disclosure of patient names and information to the media has been more 
prevalent in the US than in Canada. In the US, the source of the disclosure to media 
may originate from a non-covered HIPAA entity – such as a family member or friend 
– or through the investigative efforts of journalists.41  
  
Finally, the OPC has published “best practice” guidelines for protecting 
privacy before, during, and after an emergency.42 These publications provide guidance 
regarding how to implement privacy practices to ensure that individual’s privacy is 
protected even during a pandemic emergency. The OPC’s publications also establish 
standards to ensure that such protections do not pose barriers to appropriate 
information sharing. Sensitive information, such as personal health information, 
should be treated with additional precautions such as strictly limiting the purposes of 
its use as well as specific storage and security requirements.43 
 
Before an emergency, organizations should establish information-sharing 
protocols that protect an individual’s privacy. For instance, such protocols should 
require an organization disclosing information to clearly establish the reasons for 
seeking the information. They should ensure that the organization shares only 
information that relate directly to the emergency, and share only the minimum personal 
information data elements required for the purposes at each stage of any authorization. 
The protocols might also require that the shared information remain separate from the 
receiving organization’s existing system. The protocols must also clearly establish the 
                                                     
39 Supra note 35, §164.510(a). Such disclosure is only permitted where the patient has not objected to or 
restricted the release of this information. If the patient is incapacitated, there must be a belief that the 
disclosure is in the best interest of the patient and is consistent with any prior expressed preferences of 
the patient. 
40 Bulletin, supra note 36 at 2. While HIPAA remains active during a public health emergency, once a public 
healthy emergency is declared certain provisions may be waived, including requirements to honour a 
request to opt out of the facility directory or adhere to a patient’s right to request privacy restrictions.  
41 See William Maruca, "Ebola in the News: Is Too Much PHI Being Revealed and by Whom?” (October 
15, 2014), HIPAA, HITECH & HIT (blog), online: <hipaahealthlaw.foxrothschild.com/2014/10/ 
articles/privacy/ebola-in-the-news-is-too-much-phi-being-revealed-and-by-whom/>. Maruca highlights 
the intense media scrutiny of certain Ebola patients in the US. It has been reported that the name of the 
nurse who contracted Ebola while treating a patient, which was widely reported in media, was determined 
by cross-referencing an address with public records and a state nursing database.  
42 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Privacy Emergency Kit” (Ottawa: OPC, 2013), online: 
<https://www.priv.gc.ca/information/pub/gd_em_201305_e.asp>. This guidance is applicable to 
organizations subject to federal privacy legislation, but its general principles may also be applied more 
broadly. 
43 Ibid at 6.   
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security of the information in transit and in storage as well as the start and end dates 
for the sharing. Other important privacy elements that should be addressed include 
access and correction rights, retention and destruction obligations, and appointing an 
individual responsible for addressing questions and complaints.44   
 
In an emergency situation where no information protocols are established, the 
OPC’s guidance suggests that the requesting organization should be required to 
explain its reasons for seeking personal information, and the information should 
similarly be the minimum necessary to achieve its purposes. Disclosures should be 
documented (e.g., personal information disclosed, when it was provided and to whom, 
for what purposes, the legislative authority for which it was provided). Unless 
otherwise required by law, an organization should notify individuals, where possible, 
about personal information that was disclosed for emergency purposes.45  
 
 
(D) Monitoring Cross-border Privacy Compliance in the Context of a Pandemic 
 
In an interconnected global context, pandemics will have broad implications that 
extend beyond borders. In Canada, authority to share information across borders can 
emerge from Canada’s international obligations and from provincial legislation. 
Canada is a signatory to the World Health Organization’s (“WHO”) International 
Health Regulations, which are legally binding regulations adopted by most countries 
to contain the rapid international spread of communicable diseases. The Regulations 
recognize the cross-border implications of a pandemic response and provide a 
framework for sharing, monitoring, and evaluating information from the sources of 
infections. The Regulations also require signatories to notify the WHO of events that 
may constitute a public health emergency of international concern according to 
defined criteria.46 Additionally, certain Canadian provincial public health acts include 
specific acknowledgement that public health and safety may require information 
sharing with other jurisdictions, including internationally.47 
                                                     
44 Ibid at 6-8.   
45 Ibid at 9-10.   
46 Signatories are required to notify the WHO of any event within its territory that may constitute a public 
health emergency of international concern, in accordance with established decision instruments.  See 
World Health Organization, International Health Regulations (2005), 2d ed (Geneva: WHO, 2005) at 
Article 6, online: <whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2008/9789241580410_eng.pdf?ua=1> [WHO IHR]. 
Signatories are also required to furnish to the WHO relevant data concerning the sources of infection or 
contamination – including vectors and reservoirs at its point of entry – which could result in international 
spread of disease. In accordance with the WHO IHR, when a state party collects or receives personal 
information pursuant to the WHO IHR from another state party or from the WHO, the former state party 
is required to keep the personal information confidential and to process it anonymously as required by 
national law. States parties may disclose and process personal information where it is essential for the 
purposes of assessing and managing a public health risk, subject to certain conditions. The information 
should be processed in accordance with national law; it should not be further processed in excess of the 
purpose; it should be accurate and up to date; and it should not be retained longer than necessary. See 
WHO IHR, Articles 19, 45, and 45.2. 
47 See e.g. Quebec’s Public Health Act, CQLR, c S-2.2., s 133; Manitoba’s Public Health Act, CCSM, c 
P210, s 80. 
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Cross-border information sharing creates higher risks for individual privacy 
due to the fact that once personal health information enters another jurisdiction, it then 
becomes subject to the privacy laws of that jurisdiction. The jurisdiction may have 
certain laws – notably anti-terrorism legislation – that could override existing 
requirements on the recipient country regarding permissible use and disclosure.48 If 
the recipient country does not have privacy protection laws – nor laws that recognize 
and protect human rights and/or civil liberties – it would be challenging to ensure that 
the information is used in a manner that meets the standards of Canada’s constitutional 
rights.49 Moreover, in cross-jurisdictional legal contexts, a further complication comes 
from the respective states’ territorial sovereignty in relation to enforcement of 
cooperation agreements and the continued control, protection, and access to 
information in the other jurisdiction.50 This greatly restricts the disclosing country’s 
ability to control the use of information in the recipient country. 
 
The consequences of cross-border personal health information sharing may 
also vary between states. In some states, such sharing can trigger significant 
restrictions on protected individual freedoms. A recent report by the Ontario 
Information Privacy Commissioner (“IPC”) underscores the adverse impact that cross-
border disclosure can have on Canadian citizens where sensitive information is shared 
with foreign government entities.  
 
The IPC’s investigation stemmed from reports that US Customs and Border 
Protection Officials were denying Canadians entry into the US on the basis of mental 
health issues. US Customs and Border Protection Officials accessed information 
recorded on the Canadian Police Information Centre (“CPIC”) database, where police 
in Ontario recorded, among other things, sensitive information about attempted 
suicides by Ontarians.51  In her findings, the Commissioner determined that the 
recording or uploading of information relating to suicide attempts or threats of suicide 
to CPIC is a disclosure under the MFIPPA and the FIPPA. While certain Ontario 
police services exercised some degree of discretion in determining whether to include 
such information on the CPIC, others automatically recorded such information into the 
                                                     
48 Canada, Chief Information Officer Branch, “Guidance on Preparing Information Sharing Agreements 
Involving Personal Information” (Ottawa: Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 2010) at 2.7.3, online: 
<www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/atip-aiprp/isa-eer/isa-eerpr-eng.asp?format=print> [Guidance on Preparing]. 
49 Ibid at 6.9.4.  
50 Institute for Citizen-Centred Service, “Government-to-Government Personal Information Sharing 
Agreements: Guidelines for Best Practice” at 30, online: <www.iccs-isac.org/en/pubs/ 
Personal%20Information%20Sharing%20Agreements%20Guidelines%20for%20Best%20Practice.pdf> 
[Government-to-Government].  
51 A Memorandum of Cooperation between the RCMP and the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) 
provides the FBI with access to CPIC. FBI grants access to the CPIC database to the US Department of 
Homeland Security, which includes US border officials. See Information and Privacy Commissioner of 
Ontario, “Crossing the Line: The Indiscriminate Disclosure of Attempted Suicide Information to US 
Border Officials via CPIC: A Special Investigation Report” (Toronto: IPC, 2014) at 2, online: 
<www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/indiscriminate_disclosure.pdf>. 
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database. The Commissioner considered the automatic recording to be in non-
compliance with these Acts.52  
 
Particularly compelling in the Commissioner’s view – and highly applicable 
in the context of information sharing in connection with pandemics – was that sensitive 
mental health information was disclosed. In the context, this disclosure posed barriers 
to those seeking travel to the US.53 This experience highlights the fact that where 
personal information or personal health information is made accessible to foreign 
government entities – such as in the context of communicable disease surveillance – 
adverse consequences can have deep impact on Canadians. Any cross-border 
information sharing should be scrutinized closely to ensure that the disclosure is 
limited and justifiable in the circumstances precisely taking into account the gravity 
of potential consequences. 
 
While cross-border sharing of personal health information is essential for 
pandemic responses in order to trace patients and contacts, the risks and consequences 
discussed above show that such sharing must be framed within strict safeguards.54 
                                                     
52 Ibid at 3. In addition to setting out other measures such as a process to seek removal of suicide or attempted 
suicide information on CPIC, the Commissioner established that information may be recorded in specified 
and limited circumstances, including where the information links more closely to potential harm. For 
example, the information may be recorded on CPIC where the person has a history of serious violence or 
where the suicide attempt involved the threat of serious violence or harm directed at other individuals. 
53 Ibid at 12. 
54 Although outside the scope of this paper, cross-jurisdictional sharing of information within Canada also 
has its challenges due to the inconsistency in the express provisions in provincial public health statutes 
that provide for inter-jurisdictional information-sharing. The provinces currently share information with 
the federal government in order to monitor infectious diseases and identify emerging health events.  Since 
these arrangements are largely built on informal relationships with few formal agreements in place, they 
present the risk of having data arrangements with few detailed parameters. See Public Health Agency of 
Canada, Overview of the Multi-Lateral Information Sharing Agreement (MLISA) to Support Public Health 
Information Sharing among Federal, Provincial and Territorial (F/P/T) Governments 
in Canada (Ottawa: PHAC, 2014) at slides 4-5, online:  <carpha.org/Portals/0/docs/MEETINGS/ 
Epid_LabDir/Kroop_MLISA%20Overview_PHAC_%202014.pdf>. The provinces and federal 
government agreed in principle in 2009 to a memorandum of understanding (“MOU”) that establishes a 
general framework for information sharing during a Public Health Emergency. This MOU does not 
contain operational details, but key elements address privacy on a general basis, including requiring that 
the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information – including personal health information – be 
carried out in the most limited manner necessary as authorized by law or an individual’s consent, on a 
need-to-know basis, and with the highest degree of anonymity possible in the circumstances and using 
the least invasive means. See Pan-Canadian Public Health Network, “Federal/Provincial/Territorial 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the Sharing of Information During a Public Health 
Emergency” (Ottawa: Pan-Canadian Public Health Network, 2012) at s 5.2, online: <www.phn-
rsp.ca/pubs/mou-is-pe-pr/index-eng.php>. In cooperation with the provinces and territories as well as the 
Public Health Network, a Multi-lateral Information Sharing Agreement has been developed to replace the 
MOU. This Agreement also sets out the surveillance information to be shared, its use, disclosure, and 
protection in the context of infectious diseases and other public health events. Its aim is to mitigate 
potential privacy risks by having a clear purpose for the collection, use and disclosure of information.  As 
of 8 October 2014, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, Nunavut, the Northwest Territories, and the Public 
Health Agency of Canada have signed the agreement. See Nova Scotia, News Release, “Province to Sign 
Information Sharing Agreement” (8 October 2014), online: Government of Nova Scotia 
<novascotia.ca/news/release/?id=20141008003>. 
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Information sharing agreements (“ISAs”) should be in place to impose limitations 
upon use and disclosure of personal health information as well as obligations of 
safeguarding, retention rules, access, and remedies for breaches.  Key guidance on 
developing information sharing agreements include Canada’s Treasury Board 
Secretariat’s Guidance on Preparing Information Sharing Agreements Involving 
Personal Information and the Public Sector CIO Council’s Government-to-
Government Personal Information Sharing Agreements Guidelines for Best 
Practice.55 Although these guidance materials focus on ISAs generally as well as in 
specified circumstances, they highlight that ISAs cover sensitive data in the exchange 
of personal health information and that such information must receive the 
proportionate level of protection.56  
 
Principles set out in the ISA guidance documents are particularly important 
when contemplating a pandemic response. For example, personal information should 
only be shared where there is legal authority and a clearly justifiable need for a 
specified and current period of time, and it should be shared only in the most limited 
manner possible and with the highest degree of anonymity possible.57 Legislation may 
also apply. For instance, the Quarantine Act permits the sharing of information with 
other states in certain circumstances, and it specifically allows personal information 
obtained under the Act to be shared with foreign governments where the Minister has 
reasonable grounds to believe that the disclosure is necessary to prevent the spread of 
a communicable disease or to enable Canada to fulfill its international obligations.58 
The Act further states that the individual to whom the information relates must be 
notified of the disclosure.59  
 
A key component of an ISA will be the inclusion of specific security 
measures that safeguard sensitive personal health information and should include 
“high standards for privacy and security, including encryption, secure storage, 
retention schedules, and requirements for secure disposal of personal information.”60 
                                                     
55 Guidance on Preparing, supra note 48; Government-to-Government, supra note 50. Guidance on 
Preparing is intended to be consulted by institutions subject to the federal Privacy Act, supra note 25. 
Government-to-Government sets out six “best practices” which form the life-cycle of the decision-making 
process for ISAs between governments within Canada: (1) identify and determine risk factors; (2) explore 
alternative strategies; (3) conduct risk assessments; (4) document the ISA decision; (5) create an ISA; and 
(6) monitor and follow-up on ISA effectiveness. 
56 Ibid at 15.  
57 Ibid at 12. 
58 Supra note 13, s 56. Personal information obtained under the Act may be disclosed to other government 
agencies and health organizations, whether domestic or foreign, if the Minister has reasonable grounds to 
believe that the disclosure is necessary to prevent the spread of a communicable disease or to enable 
Canada to fulfill its international obligations. 
59 Ibid, s 56(3). 
60 See Information and Privacy Commissioner of British Columbia, Investigation Report F10-02 Review of 
the Electronic Health Information System at Vancouver Coastal Health Authority Known as the Primary 
Access Regional Information System (“PARIS”) (Victoria: Office of the Information and Privacy 
Commissioner for British Columbia, 2010) at para 120 (addressing personal health information sharing 
by a public body). 
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The sending organization should “push” the information to the recipient organization 
in the other jurisdiction in the manner and times provided for in the agreement, since 
the alternative of having the other party “pull” the information would require giving 
them broad access to a database.61 The ISAs should also include robust prohibitions 
on secondary use and disclosure. Such prohibitions should consider any applicable 
access and other privacy laws that could apply in the recipient jurisdiction, and should 
additionally establish a consultation procedure for such circumstances.62 In the context 
of cross-border transfers, the receiving jurisdiction’s laws – including applicable anti-
terrorism laws – may determine the enforceability of clauses that restrict the purposes 
for which information can be used. Accordingly, ISAs should include protective 
clauses to address this.63 The guidance document also suggests additional requirements 
such as segregating shared data from its records or notifying when the information is 
disclosed under foreign law. 
 
Accordingly, while cross-border information sharing is necessary when faced 
with the threat of a pandemic emergency, cross-border sharing presents unique risks 
to individual privacy. Once information is shared with another jurisdiction, it becomes 
subject to the laws of that jurisdiction respecting the collection, use, and disclosure of 
personal health information, and the disclosing jurisdiction can do little to ensure 
compliance with its privacy standards. In turn, cross-border information sharing must 
be framed within strict safeguards such as ISAs. 
 
 
(E) Safeguards in the Context of Multi-Sectorial Information Sharing on 
Vulnerable Platforms 
 
In relation to privacy, protective pandemic intervention would integrate both specific 
and generic safeguards. Safeguards should specifically ensure that patient data are de-
identified unless identification is demonstrably necessary, and that no personal 
information be collected, used, or shared if non-personal information meets public 
health needs. Such data-minimization efforts must be supported by either destruction 
or segregation of identifying data, along with clear data linkage rules and a separately 
held patient linkage index (i.e., central repository assigning meaningless numbers to 
records in an anonymized manner). In broad strokes, the governance framework would 
be built on three main categories of data:  
 
(i) Anonymized data, which is data completely severed from identifiers in a 
manner that would make re-identification so arduous to be remote. This data 
could be used and shared without the restrictions of privacy protection since 
the privacy interest has been practically eliminated.   
(ii) Pseudonymized data, which is data where the real identifiers have been 
replaced by artificial identifiers, such as a bar code, to protect privacy but 
                                                     
61 Government-to-Government, supra note 50 at 16.  
62 Guidance on Preparing, supra note 48 at 6.5. 
63 Government-to-Government, supra note 50 at 30. See also Guidance on Preparing, supra note 48 at 6.9.3. 
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also allow tracking back to the original identifiers when identification 
becomes necessary. Rules must be developed in each case to state when 
tracing back to the original data may be justified and how the pseudonymized 
data must be held to ensure there is no re-identification other than as allowed. 
(iii) Identifiable data, which, of course, means data that contains identifiers. This 
data receives full protection of privacy law.  
 
In addition to the governance framework, de-identification methods must be 
further developed and must properly balance private and public interests.64 Limiting 
access to de-identified personal health information and ensuring that data-sharing 
agreements are in place can reduce the risks of re-identification.65 A retention schedule 
would ensure the timely destruction of personal health information and of de-identified 
or aggregate information is done as soon as it is no longer relevant.  
 
Specific technological and administrative safeguards must also be developed. 
Technological safeguards should be calibrated by threat and risk assessments in order 
to protect sensitive personal health information. These safeguards must be in place 
prior to the adoption of new technology and must integrate commensurate protection 
into technological infrastructure.66 Moreover, the staff who use this technology must 
also be digitally literate. Administrative safeguards – such as clear privacy practices 
supported by training and appropriate disciplinary measures – must also be in place.  
 
It is established that general safeguards must reflect the sensitivity of personal health 
information and the high level of trust that the patient places in the health system. The 
importance of each factor calls for commensurate protective measures. The 
                                                     
64 For example, under the Ontario PHIPA, supra note 25, s 4(1)–(2), “personal health information” is defined 
as “identifying information” that “identifies an individual or for which it is reasonably foreseeable in the 
circumstances that it could be utilized, either alone or with other information, to identify an individual.” 
Under the US HIPAA, supra note 35, § 165.514(a), de-identified information is not personal health 
information and therefore is not protected by the Privacy Rule. See generally US Department of Health 
& Human Services, “Guidelines Regarding Methods for De-identification of Protected Health 
Information in Accordance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
Privacy Rule”  (Washington, DC: US Department of Health & Human Service, 2010), online: 
<www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/De-identification/guidance .html>. For 
a discussion on risk-management approaches to de-identification of personal health information, see 
Khaled El Emam, “De-identifying Health Data for Secondary Use: A Framework” (22 October 2008), 
online: Electronic Health Information Laboratory <www.ehealthinformation.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/2008-A-framework.pdf>. 
65 Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, “Looking Forward: De-identification Developments: 
New Tools, New Challenges”, by Ann Cavoukian (Toronto: IPC, May 2013) at 12, online: 
<www.privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2013/05/de-identifcation-developments.pdf>. 
66 See e.g. Communications Security Establishment & Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Harmonized Threat 
and Risk Assessment (TRA) Methodology, TRA-1 (Ottawa: CSE, 23 October 2007); eHealth Ontario, 
“Guide to Information Security for the HealthCare Sector” (Toronto: eHealth Ontario, 2010), online: 
eHealth Ontario <www.ehealthontario.on.ca/images/uploads/pages/documents/InfoSecGuide 
_Complex.pdf>. In the US, HIPAA’s Security Management Process requires organizations to “implement 
policies and procedures to prevent, detect, contain, and correct security violations” and to “conduct an 
accurate and thorough assessment of the potential risks and vulnerabilities to the confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability of electronic protected health information held by the covered entity”. See HIPAA, supra 
note 35, §164.308(a)(1). 
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implementation of such general safeguards rests upon a robust and clear governance 
framework that ensures privacy impact assessments for any measure that has privacy 
implications, and an accountability framework to ensure compliance. 
 
 
4.  Moving Forward: Respecting Data Minimization and Achieving Data 
Optimization in Pandemic Response 
 
The ethical dilemma at the heart of this discussion relates to balancing 
between two factors: namely, the individual harms of disclosure and stigmatization, 
on the one hand, and the collective harm of non-disclosure, on the other. In the 
background, many believe that data analytics – including analytics regarding personal 
information – should be allowed to advance scientific knowledge of pandemic 
diseases. Indeed, treasures of scientifically relevant information should not lie unused 
or be destroyed if they can be used in a privacy-protective manner.  
 
This dilemma calls for both legal and technological solutions.  Legally, the 
challenge calls for a framework moving from a static notion of personal information 
to a dynamic notion that takes into account how the collection, use, and disclosure of 
information would impact the individual. A static notion of personal information is 
rigid in the sense that personal information is described in law and governed by clear 
rules, without full consideration of context embedded in its application. A dynamic 
notion, on the other hand, is founded in human rights law, balancing individual rights 
and collective rights. The optimization of data requires this balancing in order to allow 
an effective response to pandemics. This would not preclude refining the framework 
for regulating “uses” and “disclosures” in certain phases of pandemics, while 
entrenching the concept of “consent” for non-critical phases of pandemic responses. 
An ethical and pragmatic governance framework would allow or prohibit use of 
personal information according to the demonstrable cost and benefit of its disclosure. 
This notion would take into account the essential considerations that must guide the 
protection of privacy through a pandemic. 
 
Technologically, we should continue to investigate with greater urgency 
anonymization or de-identification techniques that prevent identification in cases 
where identity is not necessary, but which allow for the use of the connecting 
information where it is necessary.67 In particular, we must develop a richer 
understanding of anonymization and de-identification as a risk-based inquiry rather 
than as a binary analysis of what is personal (and therefore protected) and what is not 
personal (and therefore available).  . 
 
The objective is to arrive at a privacy protection framework for pandemic 
prevention and response that that serves both individual privacy interests and 
                                                     
67 Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario & Electronic Health Information, University of 
Ottawa, “De-identification Protocols: Essential for Protecting Privacy”, by Ann Cavoukian and Khaled 
El Emam (Toronto: IPC, June 2014), online: <www.privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2014/06/pbd-
de-identifcation_essential.pdf>. 
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collective interests in public health. In summary, this framework must be of 
international scope and contain:  
 
(i) A specific set of rules for collection, use, and disclosure of personal 
information in the context of the imperatives of preventing and responding to 
pandemics; 
(ii) Regimes for the management and safeguard of anonymized, pseudonymized, 
and identifiable data; 
(iii) Definitions of individual rights and obligations in the context of pandemics, 
in relation to consent, access, and duty to disclose personal health information 
in the public interest; and 
(iv) Monitoring mechanisms to ensure the compliance of all states concerned.  
  
This framework is essential to regulate the use of personal health information in the 
international context of pandemic prevention and response. The framework must 
balance individual and collective rights. In relation to individual rights, a specific set 
of rules must clearly define the circumstances in which a duty to disclose would apply 
and the circumstances that would require meaningful consent. In relation to collective 
rights, the dissemination of information, which is key to coordinate response and 
manage outbreak, must be unambiguously allowed where necessary, but must also be 
explicitly prohibited to the extent that the disclosure is not justified by exacting 
scientific standards. This international framework would support pandemic response 
by governing all states involved in relation to common norms and mechanisms.  In this 
way, the individual harms of personal health information disclosure may be balanced 
against the collective harms of non-disclosure and we ensure the greater good, in full 
respect of individual rights. 
